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Abstract
This review offers a joint perspective on Chinese and European key demographic trends
in the family domain, emphasising the impact of macro-level social structures and insti-
tutions on individual life courses. We outline key demographic shifts across the
Netherlands, Germany, the UK and China in the period after the ‘golden age of the
welfare state’ in Europe and the ‘post-reform’ era in China (after the 1970s). Several
empirical trends are highlighted, with a focus on: rising inequality in China and persistent
inequality in Europe; the traditional family sequence in China and de-standardization of
life courses in Europe; ending with similarities between countries in population aging
and differences in later life courses with regards to intergenerational transfers. We draw
upon a range of theoretical frameworks to argue that trends in marriage, fertility
and intergenerational relationships reflect tensions between rapid social and economic
changes and discuss the limitations of modernisation theories and the second
demographic transition.
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Introduction
Family relationships change over time due to multiple factors, including norms and
values on individual and societal levels, economic and political events and policy
reforms. Past literature has long examined demographic convergence across
European countries, oﬀering evidence for greater similarities over time undeterred
by persistent idiosyncrasies (Billari, 2005; Coleman and Garssen, 2002; Esping-
Andersen and Billari, 2015; Gauthier, 2007). Timing of life-course events such as
marriage, becoming a parent, going from school to work, becoming a grandparent
and retiring have shifted. In addition, the order of these events has been increas-
ingly varied across countries. Some European scholars have argued that this pre-
sents evidence for deinstitutionalisation (Kohli, 2007; Mayer, 2009) or de-
standardisation of the life course (Elzinga and Liefbroer, 2007). At the same
time, European demographic literature has emphasised the ways that national
policies and laws shape the life courses across countries in order to explain
cohort patterns (see Hagestad and Dykstra, 2016; Saraceno and Keck, 2010, 2011).
Whereas European scholarship attempted to explain the changes in family pat-
terns and demographics, Chinese scholars have been interested in ﬁnding out how,
despite large social changes, the Chinese kinship system has managed to maintain
some relatively stable features. The cultural peculiarity of the three ‘big Ps’ –
patrilinealism, patrilocalism, and patriarchalism – has been particularly accentu-
ated (Chu et al., 2011; Freedman, 1970; Goode, 1963; Greenhalgh, 1985).
A comparative perspective on family dynamics between Chinese and Western
families to date centred on a ‘converging versus diverging’ debate, attempting
to ﬁnd diﬀerences and similarities between demographic trends across countries.
For example, several studies investigated whether demographic trends in China
resemble those in the West and how family transitions in East Asia are related
to the second demographic transition (SDT) occurring in the West (Ji, 2015;
Thornton and Fricke, 1987). This approach oﬀered only limited insights into
observed diﬀerences across social contexts, for several reasons. One was the over-
whelming focus on the USA as a point of reference. A second limitation was the
lack of alternative explanations for the relative stability seen in Chinese families
that goes beyond emphasising the cultural exclusivity of Asian societies (e.g. the
Confucian tradition). The third factor that limited research insights was the lack of
a theoretical framework that could explain the divergence of observed trends in
the advanced stages of the life course. Earlier studies have successfully compared
fertility patterns, as well as the transition to adulthood across countries, including
China (Nauck et al., 2017), but comparative studies on the family lives of older
adults are still lacking.
How can an understanding of the family transitions in the European context
help scholars to understand the current family and demographic changes in China?
In cross-national research, China has frequently been compared with other
Asian countries, and with the USA. Thus, Chinese literature on family patterns
is saturated with emphasis on a shared cultural meaning. Nonetheless, life courses
in China are structured by family and labour market policies in ways comparable
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to the welfare state arrangements in European countries. This review oﬀers a joint
perspective on China and Europe that emphasises the impact of macro-level social
structures and institutions on the individual life course (Hagestad and Dykstra,
2016). We highlight several empirical trends in China and selected European
countries. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the rising inequality in China versus stable
or persistent inequality in Europe; the traditional family sequence in China
versus de-standardisation in Europe and the similarities and diﬀerences between
China and European countries in population ageing and the later life course.
As a point of departure, the review ﬁrst covers the theoretical arguments used in
the earlier literature to explain family patterns and demographic trends. To organ-
ise the huge amount of empirical evidence, we outline the key demographic shifts
across the Netherlands, Germany, UK and China in the overlapping periods after
the ‘golden age of the welfare state’ in Europe and the ‘post-reform’ era in China
(after the 1970s). An overview of the trends in the life-course domains of work and
family highlights country-level diﬀerences. Aggregate trends are used to explore the
direction and magnitude of changes in family patterns and socio-demographic
measures over time. The review ends with a summary of key trends, highlights
gaps in current research and oﬀers an outlook for the future of comparative demo-
graphic research.
Theories of change
Life-course theory lends a great deal of its taxonomy to comparative studies of the
family. However, discrepancies in empirical research regarding data and measures
have inhibited the use of life-course principles for understanding comparative
change across China and Western societies. Instead, modernisation dominates
the discourse of convergence, arguing that through economic modernisation the
‘traditional’ family in non-Western contexts will become similar to the Western
‘modern’ family. The structural-functionalist assumption of a linear, uniform path
of development from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ has underpinned this argument and
equates the contemporary developing societies with historical pre-industrial socie-
ties in the West (Applebaum, 1970). Introduced by Parsons (1966) and further
developed by Hoselitz (1960) and Rostow (1960) (Chirot and Hall, 1982: 81–82),
its tenets and assumptions have put non-Western countries at the traditional end of
a continuum featuring familism, extended households, young and parentally
arranged marriage, parental control, low status for women and natural fertility.
The ‘modern’ Western family has been projected to embody the opposites – indi-
vidualism, mature and consensual marriage, independent living, personal freedom,
high status for women and controlled fertility (Thornton, 2001; Thornton and
Philipov, 2009). Thornton (2001) challenges the linear narrative of progress and
convergence, pointing out the normative burden of modernisation as one perpetu-
ating the myth of an inevitable family transition. The ideas that ‘modern society
and modern family are good and attainable’, ‘modern family is a cause and an
eﬀect of modern society’ and ‘individuals are free and equal, social relationships are
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based on consent’ constitute ‘developmental idealism’ (Thornton, 2001: 455).
According to the idea of ‘developmental idealism’, changes in family aspirations
contributed to non-Western families adapting in ways similar to the projected
‘modern’ family. This resulted in hierarchies based on generation and gender
being increasingly delegitimised.
Another perspective also incorporating values and norms as foundations of
family change is the theory of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). This
theory has dominated the narrative of demographic change in the European con-
text for many decades and summarises the demographic patterns of delayed mar-
riage, increasing marriage dissolutions and decreasing fertility levels accompanied
by increasing female labour force participation (Lesthaeghe, 1983, 1995, 2014; Van
de Kaa, 1987, 2001). Ideational shifts towards post-materialistic values, as well as
progressive and individualistic norms are identiﬁed as direct causes of these trends.
In turn, these normative shifts directly inﬂuence the acceptance of cohabitation, the
growth of out-of-wedlock fertility and childbearing becoming a deliberate choice of
self-fulﬁlment. However, some of the SDT features, such as increasing levels of
cohabitation, nonmarital births, divorce, and single-parent families, are found in
the European and other Western contexts, yet these seem entirely absent in China.
It remains a puzzle to scholars why the latter trends are not seen in Asian countries.
Focusing on the economic foundation of social relationships, the rational choice
approach of the New Home Economics (NHE) (Becker, 1960, 1981) oﬀers a ration-
ale for marriage using welfare and eﬃciency gains. The complementarity of spousal
skills and task specialisation is predicted to oﬀer greater returns to marriage
that would otherwise decline when men’s and women’s marketable skills begin to
converge. According to the NHE, women’s pursuit of careers shifts the opportunity
cost of motherhood upwards, which causes abandonment of marriage by
non-marriage and marriage dissolution. In the short term, rational choice theorists
conclude that the instability of marriage is a byproduct of women’s pursuit of
employment and careers. Despite some diﬀerences between rational choice and
the SDT theory, both predict that in the future there would be ‘less family’
(Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015). However, rational choice and the SDT
theory have also not been able to explain the relative stability of marital childbear-
ing, low childlessness and low cohabitation rates in the Asian context.
Focusing on fertility change, McDonald (2000a, 2000b, 2006) introduces a
gender equity theory of fertility. McDonald (2000a, 2000b, 2006) argues that low
fertility is caused by a discontinuity in women’s experiences in formal institutions
(e.g. education and employment), and family institutions. In societies with strong
patriarchal traditions, including Asian societies, women enjoy improvement in
education and employment, but limited change in expectations within the family.
As a consequence, fertility as well as marriage rates are declining over time. Women
encounter low status and low levels of gender equity within the family and in
family-orientated institutions and, at the same time, few sources of support outside
the family. Closely related to this view, a group of scholars argue that role incom-
patibility between work and childrearing accounts for low marriage and fertility
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rates (Bumpass et al., 2009; Rindfuss et al., 2004). Because normative linkage
between marriage and fertility remains strong in Asian countries, institutional con-
ﬁgurations and rigid norms that are unsupportive of working mothers lead to
women avoiding marriage and childrearing altogether. Whereas the SDT
theory ascribes changes in demographic trends and family patterns to changes in
individuals’ preferences and norms related to family, the abovementioned theories
on fertility change imply that structural conditions interacting with limited changes
in social norms can explain delayed marriage and childbearing patterns.
The theoretical frameworks mentioned tackle changes in marriage and fertility
trends; however, scholars seldom refer to them when they discuss changes occur-
ring in the later life course. Members of multiple generations, sometimes up to ﬁve,
are alive at the same time in both China and Europe due to population ageing.
Hajnal (1982) compared household and family structures between pre-industria-
lised Europe and other countries, including China, noting that both household
systems exhibited early age at marriage for men and women; co-residence with
an older couple in charge of the household; and division of households with several
married couples to form two or more households, each containing one or more
couples. Thornton et al. (1984) compared China to Western countries to investigate
how industrialisation, long-term economic growth and urbanisation modiﬁed
family patterns. Older studies were quick to conclude that there had been a decline
in the provision of household repairs and ﬁnances by men (sons) and help with
housework by women (daughters) in Western countries (Bumpass, 1990). Many
interpreted these ﬁndings as an erosion of pro-familial normative pressures for
younger generations, but the proclamations of abandonment of older parents
prominent in the modernisation literature have been disputed by more recent
empirical research (Aboderin, 2004).
Moving beyond investigating the erosion of the extended family, European
scholars are still fond of Reher’s (1998) ‘strong versus weak family ties’ framework
that divides European countries accordingly. Nonetheless, recognising the multi-
dimensionality of intergenerational relationships, Bengtson and Roberts (1991)
developed a theoretical model of intergenerational solidarity to encompass contact,
emotional attachment, agreement, patterns of instrumental support or resource
sharing, norms or expectations of individual obligations to the family and the
opportunity structure for intergenerational relationships (Dykstra and Fokkema,
2011; Van Gaalen and Dykstra, 2006). In the European literature, relationship
quality has gained importance over ﬁnancial and material obligations as the
basis for intergenerational interactions (Dykstra and Knipscheer, 1995;
Hagestad, 1992).
Co-residence patterns of parents and children before and after marriage,
together with the increased independence of young people, has been the main
focus of Chinese scholars. Socio-cultural explanations, alongside material con-
straints, have dominated the literature on intergenerational relationships trying
to explain patterns of co-residence and intergenerational support in China.
The material constraints explanation has made use of historical changes in the
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system of economic production to explain changes in demographic trends and family
patterns and contextual explanations, such as a lack of social welfare, to explain
stability in family patterns (Bian et al., 1998; Chu and Yu, 2010; Logan and Bian,
1999). Critics of this type of research have pointed out that a priori conceptions
about social life in pre-industrial societies encourage the use of structural-function-
alist arguments, and empirical research has provided limited support for this
(Aboderin, 2004). Families and family support are not ‘breaking down’ but
rather are adapting to new socioeconomic realities, and the broad cultural values
of intergenerational support have remained relatively stable over time.
Trends
Rising inequality in China versus persistent inequality in Europe
A principal diﬀerence in the income distribution between China and European
countries lies in the institutional arrangements that favour non-labour factors as
legitimate participants in the redistribution of wealth in European countries (Gu
et al., 2007). In particular, the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s in the
UK, Germany and the Netherlands used universal rights as a basis for starting
social assistance and social insurance programmes (De Swaan, 1988). Similarly, in
China since 2003, increasing income inequality has been addressed through labour
market policies aimed at the urban working population and social assistance poli-
cies aimed at the ageing population (Stiglitz, 2015). In the meantime, China has
become a middle-income economy at a much faster pace than its European and
Latin American counterparts, with living standards of China’s population rising
rapidly and dramatically. From observing the Gini index trends over time, how-
ever, scholars have concluded that despite unprecedented economic prosperity
inequality in post-2000 China remains greater than in European countries. For
example, in 2008, the Gini index for China (42.8) was higher than those for the
Netherlands (29.9), the UK (34.4) and Germany (31.3) (World Bank, 2018c).
Comparing the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita levels in the period
1970–2015 shows that the absolute rise in China’s GDP is still below European
levels (Table 1), though these trends may reverse in the future.
With rising economic prosperity, China witnessed an educational expansion and
accelerated growth of its higher education system, particularly after 1999 (Li and
Liu, 2015). Between 2000 and 2015, the proportion of Chinese entering tertiary
education increased from below 10% to above 40% (Table 2). Despite the rapid
growth in access to education, the proportion of the Chinese population that
completed university education is still far below the levels observed in Germany
(65.5% in 2014) and the Netherlands (78.5% in 2014) (Barro and Lee, 2013a).
In China, the enrolment in tertiary education expanded from 23% in 2010 to
43.4% in 2015 (United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural
Organization, 2018). With regards to gender, in all countries of the European
Union by the year 2000 there were more women than men aged 18 to 21 enrolled
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in tertiary education (Eurostat, 2002). The latest ﬁndings for China suggest that
more women than men there are currently going to college; however, this is the case
only for the cohorts born after 1990 (Barro and Lee, 2013a, 2013b).
Despite the substantial expansion of educational opportunities in the last few
decades, family background plays a signiﬁcant role in school enrolment and school
transitions in China (Hannum and Xie, 1994; Wu, 2010). This persists across time
Table 2. Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%).a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970 0.9 13.4 19.5 14.1
1975 1.1 24.6 25.5 18.8
1980 1.3 26.2 30.0 20.1
1985 2.9 29.9 31.8 21.7
1990 2.9 33.9 39.8 30.2
1995 5.3 44.4 48.6 48.3
2000 8.0 48.6 53.0 58.0
2005 18.0 52.8 59.0 59.0
2010 23.0 57.0 64.0 61.0
2015 43.4 68.5 80.6 57.3
2016 51.0 68.3 80.4 59.4
adata from United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2018) and
Barro and Lee (2013c).
Table 1. Gross Domestic Product per capita in billions of US dollars.a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970 111.8 2750.7 2889.7 2347.5
1975 175.9 6212.8 7241.9 4299.8
1980 193.2 12,092.4 13,615.8 10,032.1
1985 292.6 9393.9 9799.4 8652.2
1990 316.2 22,219.6 21,019.1 19,095.5
1995 607.6 31,729.7 28,884.7 21,330.3
2000 954.6 23,718.8 25,921.1 26,400.7
2005 1740.1 34,696.6 41,577.1 40,048.0
2010 4515.0 41,788.1 50,341.3 38,292.9
2015 7924.7 41,219.1 44,433.4 43,734.0
2017 8827.0 44,469.9 48,223.2 39,720.4
adata from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018b)
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as students from high socioeconomic backgrounds have higher chances to be
admitted to universities (Jia and Ericson, 2017). Researchers have argued that
despite enormous intergenerational mobility in education, income and occupation
in the period after 2000, there has been a subsequent deceleration of these trends
(Cai, 2015; Khor and Pencavel, 2006, 2008, 2010). This points to family formation
and kin relationships as fundamental assets for the accumulation of long-term
wealth and well-being over the life course in China, in addition to these factors
being precursors to the development of human capital. In contrast, in Europe there
is great variety in the eﬀects of family background (alternatively social origin and
family environment, or parental background and social class). The idea that edu-
cational expansion necessarily brings educational equalisation is rooted in mod-
ernisation theory, but empirical studies across European countries have frequently
shown otherwise (Blossfeld et al., 2016; Breen and Jonsson, 2005). Across cohorts,
the eﬀect of parental background on the transitions to tertiary education are insig-
niﬁcant in Germany and the Netherlands (Blossfeld and Shavit, 2010), but still
signiﬁcant for England (Mu¨ller et al., 1996). Parental background has an eﬀect on
transitions in early education in Germany because of early educational tracking,
but less eﬀect in the Netherlands (Blossfeld and Shavit, 2010; Blossfeld et al., 2016).
Therefore, the eﬀects of family background on educational mobility seem to appear
at diﬀerent educational levels in diﬀerent European countries, and across European
countries inequalities seem to persist over time despite moments of lower inequality
(Breen et al., 2009).
Along with increased rates of women entering education at all levels, women’s
participation in the labour force has been consistently high in China, even before
the 1990s (Table 3). In comparison to European countries (Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK), female labour force participation in China traditionally
has always been substantially higher. Since 1992 in China, the proportion of work-
ing women has declined and the socioeconomic reforms have been associated with
a retreat of the government sector from several areas of the economy. This has led
to higher competition for jobs and an absence of aﬀordable childcare services.
Along with economic prosperity that has enabled women to participate solely in
unpaid care tasks (rearing children and taking care of older parents and in-laws),
the educational expansion at the time also streamed large proportions of young
women into higher education, and delayed their labour market entry. The changing
levels of educational attainment and the greater employment opportunities for
women across countries have been accompanied by a common postponement of
the transitions to marriage and parenthood.
The traditional family sequence in China versus a de-standardisation
of life courses in Europe
Traditional Chinese culture places great importance on the family, and arranged
marriages for young persons at early ages used to be common practice (Thornton
and Lin, 1994). The Chinese population still practices universal and early marriage,
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although universal marriage has been in decline (Raymo et al., 2015). Marriage
occurs in a narrow age range, but the determinants of marriage have changed over
the last decade (Yu and Xie, 2015a). By 2010 the mean age at ﬁrst marriage
in China had slightly increased for men (26, in Table 4) and for women (23.9 in
Table 5). Studies have shown that age at ﬁrst marriage has been increasing for both
men and women over time in China for both urban and rural populations since the
1980s (Cai and Feng, 2014; Feng and Tuma, 1993; Wang and Mason, 2008),
though the pace has not been comparable to that in European countries.
Notably, the ages at ﬁrst marriage in China for men and women are still below
the average ages at ﬁrst marriage in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK by
more than ﬁve years, across all time periods. Another diﬀerence between China and
European countries can be found in the age range at which most marriages occur.
In China, marriages are still concentrated in a narrow age range, whereas in
European countries and particularly in Germany there is great variation in the
age at ﬁrst marriage (Fulda, 2017).
In selected European countries in the past two decades, committed nonmarital
relationships and, in particular, cohabitation have been considered normatively
similar to marriage. In the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, cohabitation
rates have been steadily on the rise over the last decades. We turn to live births
outside marriage to illustrate this trend. For example, live births outside marriage
were below 10% of all births in 1960 in all three countries. In 2016, live births
outside marriage have risen to 50.4% of all births in the Netherlands, 35.5% in
Germany, and almost 47.7% in the UK (Eurostat, 2018). The latest data from the
China Family Panel Study (CFPS) indicate that although not as prevalent as in
Europe, premarital cohabitation has reached almost one-third for the most recent
Table 3. Labour force participation rate, female (% of female population
ages 15þ) (modelled International Labour Organization (ILO) estimate).a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970
1975 27.9
1980 70.6 40.1 29.2 45.7
1985 41.1 35..9 48.7
1990 72.7 43.4 43.0 52.6
1995 72.2 47.7 47.4 57.8
2000 70.7 49.2 53.3 54.1
2005 66.5 50.6 56.8 55.0
2010 63.5 52.7 58.2 55.5
2015 54.7 58.8 57.2
2017 55.9 58.8 57.8
adata from ILO (2018).
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marriage cohort in 2010–2012, whereas it was virtually absent for marriage cohorts
before the 1980s (Yu and Xie, 2015a, 2015b).
Marriage markets: Marriage squeeze occurs in China but not in Europe
The marriage market in China is known for a male marriage squeeze due to the sex
ratio at birth (hereafter SRB) being consistently high since the 1980s (Attane´, 2006;
Guilmoto, 2012; Jiang et al., 2011, 2014). The skewed sex ratio resulted in great
Table 5. Mean age at first marriage (men).a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970 24.4
1975 25.0
1980 25.0 25.3
1985 26.0 26.0
1990 24.0 28.2 28.5 27.2
1995 29.5 29.7 28.9 28.9
2000 25.1 30.5 30.7 30.5
2005 25.7 31.9 31.8 31.7
2010 26.0 32.4 32.1
2014 33.4 33.0 33.0 32.5
adata from Raymo et al. (2015) for China; Office for National Statistics (2018)
for UK and Eurostat (2017) for Germany and Netherlands.
Table 4. Mean age at first marriage (women).a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970 20.2 22.4
1975 21.9 22.8
1980 23.0 23.0
1985 21.8 23.8
1990 22.1 25.5 26.1 25.2
1995 22.9 26.7 27.3 26.8
2000 23.1 27.7 28.0 28.2
2005 24.6 29.1 29.2 29.5
2010 23.9 29.8 30.0
2014 30.7 30.4 30.6
adata from Raymo et al. (2015) for China; Office for National Statistics (2018)
for UK and Eurostat (2017) for Germany and Netherlands.
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academic interest in investigating the marriage squeeze. In the 2010 census, the
SRB was 118.6 (long form) and 117.96 (short form)1 (PCO, 2012). Using an index
of spousal sex ratio and taking the age structure into account, Jiang et al. (2016)
expected a shortage rather than an excess of eligible males in the years from 2010 to
2020. In contrast, after 2030 a shortage of female cohorts aged 25–40 and an excess
of males are expected. Note that a marriage squeeze depends on the size variations
of birth cohorts (large diﬀerences between male and female cohorts might create a
mismatch) (Bergstrom and Lam, 1991), but measures of marriage squeeze have
more or less taken into account such variations. However, measures rely on
ﬁxed intervals of spousal age diﬀerence, whereas studies point to a decreasing
age homogamy over time in China (Mu and Xie, 2014).
Age and educational homogamy in marriage has been decreasing in
recent decades
Due to the more balanced SRBs in European countries, researchers there have
shown little interest in marriage squeezes. Instead, age homogamy has been the
focus of studies on marriage. In the Netherlands, using the average age diﬀerence
between men and women, Van Poppel et al. (2001) found that more than 50% of
marriages in the 1970s and early 1980s were age-homogamous. In Europe during
the period between 1990 and 2000, the proportion of age-homogamous ﬁrst mar-
riages decreased, signalling a reversal of this long-term trend towards smaller age
diﬀerences between spouses. Similarly, examining the patterns in age homogamy by
birth cohort and gender in China, Mu and Xie (2014) found an increase in hom-
ogamy (age diﬀerence of ﬁve years or less) for marriage cohorts prior to 1990 and
decreases thereafter. The investigation of age homogamy became more complicated
in the European context due to the increasing level of cohabitation and remarriage.
Bhrolcha´in (1992) decomposed the overall change in the age diﬀerence between
spouses into one component attributable to changing age diﬀerences and another
due to changing composition by marital status of partners, revealing complicated
patterns. The trends in the gap at men’s and women’s ﬁrst marriages were very
similar up to 1970, then diverged between 1970 and 1983, with the age diﬀerence
increasing in women’s ﬁrst marriages but decreasing in men’s ﬁrst marriages.
Despite studies using diﬀerent deﬁnitions and methods, it appears that there is a
decrease in age homogamy in both China and European countries in the post-2000
decades. Although more direct evidence is needed, Mu and Xie (2014) and Yu and
Xie (2015a) attribute the decrease in age homogamy to intensiﬁed economic pres-
sure, rising consumerism and a shrinking gender gap in education during the post-
1990s reform era. These factors have increased women’s desire to marry men who
are more economically established, and thus often older than their less ﬁnancially
well-oﬀ counterparts. Hence, age hypergamy is a product of the desire to maintain
status hypergamy, a deeply rooted value in China.
The reversed gender gap in education in European countries has had several
implications for union formation and assortative mating. Much of the academic
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interest has been directed towards ﬁnding out how women’s high educational
attainment is associated with educational homogamy. Recent studies showed
that contingent on respondents’ own educational attainment and on the cohort-
speciﬁc sex ratio among the population born in 1950–1969 with tertiary education
at the country level, highly educated women (International Standard Classiﬁcation
of Education (ISCED) 5) tend to partner more often with less educated men (rather
than remain single), and intermediate educated women (ISCED 3 and 4) partner
less often with highly educated men (De Hauw et al., 2017). There is no evidence
that men are more likely to partner with highly educated women, however, and
men are more often found to be single. For highly educated men, the odds of living
with a highly educated partner, if anything, are slightly lower in the European
countries and cohorts in which highly educated women strongly outnumber male
peers (De Hauw et al., 2017).
Marriage is becoming more exclusive
The proportion of never-married men is not only growing in European countries,
but is also becoming more pronounced in China. The age-speciﬁc marriage rates
indicate that marriage frequency signiﬁcantly declined between 2000 and 2010,
especially at the peak ages for marriage. More men than women remained unmar-
ried until later ages, accounting for more than 75% of the never-married popula-
tion above age 30 in China. For example, men constituted 90% of all unmarried
persons by age 45 in 2010 (Lu and Wang, 2014). In addition, in both China
and Europe there was an educational gradient in the marriage market by which
educated men were much more likely to marry compared to uneducated men.
In China, men with secondary or higher education were almost universally married
by age 40, whereas 10% of those with a primary education level and 40% of those
with no schooling were still unmarried in 2010. Similarly, pooled data from 28
European countries showed that men are more likely to remain unmarried: 49.6%
of the single men were never married by 2012, while only 27.8% of the single
women were never married (De Hauw et al., 2017). Along with more highly edu-
cated women on the dating market, there has also been an increase in single men,
particularly among the lower educated. In Europe, marriage frequency seems to
be declining over time for men who are either highly educated or lower educated.
In comparison, the marriage frequency in China seems to be declining over time
only for lower educated men.
Lower fertility: Parenthood is delayed across all countries but
at a different pace
China and the three European countries experienced a rapid decline in the total
fertility rate (TFR), but the decline occurred during diﬀerent periods. At present,
China resembles Germany, as both countries have extremely low fertility rates.
The transition to low fertility in China began in the 1980s (Cai, 2008; Poston,
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2000), more than a decade later than the transition in Europe. Since 1990, the
TFR in China has been below replacement level, whereas this occurred much ear-
lier in Germany (1970), the Netherlands and the UK (1975) (Table 6). The
low TFR seems to be less of a concern in European countries due to immigration,
population momentum and increases in life expectancy that have contributed to a
growing population over the last few decades. In addition to low fertility, there is a
considerable delay in the transition to parenthood in all countries, a phenomenon
referred to as the ‘postponement transition’ (Balbo et al., 2013; Billari et al., 2006;
Kohler et al., 2002). In China, the postponement transition has been delayed
and dampened, as the mean age at ﬁrst birth for women has increased moderately,
for example, from 23 in 1990 to 26.2 in 2010 (Table 7). The rise of age at ﬁrst
birth in China is comparable to that in the Netherlands in the period between 1990
(27.5) and 2010 (29.7), and the UK in the period between 1990 (27.3) and 2015
(28.7), but the increase is not comparable to that in Germany (22.34 in 1985 to
29.50 in 2015).
Nonmarital childbearing occurs often in Europe but not in China
In China, age at ﬁrst birth reﬂects age at ﬁrst marriage as there is a traditional
sequencing of childbirth after marriage. The gap between marriage and ﬁrst birth
has slowly increased in China, from 3.61 years in 2000 to 3.72–3.88 years in 2010
(Wang and Fu, 2013). In contrast, across European countries, childbirth is less
frequently preceded by marriage. A growing trend over time shows that childbear-
ing occurs in cohabiting unions and is becoming less tied to a marital union (Balbo
et al., 2013). This trend is strongest in Anglo-Saxon countries, in which
Table 6. Total fertility rate.a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970 5.7 2.1 2.6 2.4
1975 3.9 1.5 1.7 1.8
1980 2.6 1.5 1.6 1.9
1985 2.7 1.4 1.5 1.8
1990 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.8
1995 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.7
2000 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.6
2005 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.8
2010 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.9
2015 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.8
2016 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.8
adata from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019).
Djundeva et al. 13
the sequence of marriage followed by childbirth by age 30 has declined for the
1950–1977 cohorts. Shares of marriages occurring after the ﬁrst birth have
increased in Northern Europe, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Anglo-Saxon
countries (Holland, 2017).
Parenthood is becoming more exclusive
In China during the period 2000–2010, the average age at childbearing increased,
parity decreased and birth interval became slightly wider in cases of more than one
registered birth. This trend is similar to the trend that the European countries
experienced between 1990 and 2000 (Billari, 2008; Kohler et al., 2002). As the
age-speciﬁc marital fertility rate resulted in an increase in the general fertility
rate by 9.61% from 2000 to 2010 in China (Fu et al., 2013), marital status as
well as age structure have become crucial for changes in China’s fertility levels.
The economic development in China has made it possible for parents to legally
acknowledge daughters. New estimates about ‘missing girls’ show that daughters
have tended to be better registered in the last few censuses compared to prior ones
(Cai, 2015; Cai and Lavely, 2003). In addition to this, the rural–urban distribution
of people in China continues to signiﬁcantly aﬀect reproductive behaviour.
Changes in rural fertility behaviour accounted for most of the decline in the
national TFR between 1982 and 2008 (Guo et al., 2012). Fertility rates have
remained higher in China’s rural areas, as exemptions from the one-child policy
apply to a minority of the population (e.g. for urban residents and government
employees) (Jiang and Zhang, 2000). These ﬁndings suggest that next to the one-
child policy, urbanisation has been responsible for about 22% of the decrease in
TFR during this period, with TFR particularly decelerating during 2001 and 2008.
Table 7. Mean age at first birth (women).a
Year China Germany Netherlands UK
1970 21.7 22.5 24.3
1975 22.6 22.5 25 24.7
1980 24.0 22.4 25.6 25.3
1985 22.7 22.3 26.5 26.2
1990 23.0 27.5 27.3
1995 23.2 28.4 28.3
2000 24.0 28.6 29.1
2005 24.1 29.0 29.9
2010 26.2 28.9 29.2 30.6
2015 29.5 29.7 28.7
adata from Raymo et al. (2015) for China; Eurostat (2017) for Germany,
Netherlands and UK.
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In China and across European countries, there is an evident educational gradi-
ent in fertility patterns. In China, women with lower education have higher fertility
compared with higher educated women (Wang and Fu, 2013). Conversely, in
European countries in the period 2000–2010 there has been a marked reversal of
the fertility decline, although this trend has not been observed equally in all
European countries (Goldstein et al., 2009; Myrskyla¨ et al., 2009). Research on
Europe has taken ‘a couples’ perspective’ on fertility, showing that both individ-
uals’ education and couples’ educational homogamy are related to national fertility
levels. That is, homogamous, highly educated couples are most likely to postpone
their ﬁrst birth and display the highest transition rates to second and third births,
subsequently. In addition, contrary to researchers’ expectations, hypergamous cou-
ples with a highly educated man and a lower educated female partner display
among the lowest second and third birth transition rates across the majority of
European countries (Nitsche et al., 2015).
Childlessness is on the rise, but much more so in Europe compared to China
Despite well documented stable preferences for marriage in China (Mu and Xie,
2014; Raymo et al., 2015), a substantial proportion of the population that remains
unmarried is childless. This has much to do with the traditional sequencing of
marriage followed by childbirth that still persists in China. Childlessness is not
recorded in the Chinese census as such, but categories such as double income no
kids (DINK) household have a very close deﬁnition. A DINK household entails a
couple with double income who are able to procreate, but actively choose not to, or
are forced not to by subjective or objective factors. According to results from the
2010 census there were around 411,000 DINK households, several times more than
in the 1990s (Hu and Peng, 2015). Survey data from older cohorts (aged 65þ)
shows the proportion of childlessness among older individuals to be approximately
4.6% (Zhang and Liu, 2007), and much higher in urban areas, for example, 10% of
older adults in Hong Kong in 2003 (Chou and Chi, 2004). Yet, childlessness is
expected to increase, and predictions based on the 2005 Census from the 40–44 age
group estimate that 25.7% of women in cities will remain childless when they reach
the age of 50 (Lui, 2010). In Western Europe, childlessness trends have followed an
asymmetric U-shaped pattern, starting from very high levels among women born in
the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century, reaching low levels among women born in
the mid-1940s, and then rising again, especially among women born in the 1950s
(Dykstra, 2009; Sobotka, 2017).
The German-speaking countries make up the group with the highest levels of
childlessness in Europe, which has been increasing sharply among women born in
the 1950s and 1960s, and especially prevalent among women who have tertiary
education (Nise´n et al., 2014; Sobotka 2012; Wood et al., 2014) and among lower
educated men (Kravdal and Rindfuss, 2008; Nise´n et al., 2013). Recent estimates
show that 23–24% of German women born in the late 1960s have remained child-
less (Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel, 2007; Sobotka, 2017). In the UK, childlessness has
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gone steeply up over time to 18% in the 1968 cohort (Beaujouan et al., 2017).
However, within each educational group, the increase in the childless across birth
cohorts has been assessed as moderate (Berrington et al., 2015).
Intergenerational relations
Living arrangements are a good indicator by which to measure family change
Trends in living arrangements are particularly important for understanding the
complex exchange of care and ﬁnancial resources across generations. Using data
from the three censuses between 1982 and 2000, Zeng and Wang (2003, 2004)
showed that the proportion of three-generation households increased while the
proportion of two-generation nuclear households decreased over time. The pro-
portion of elderly parents (aged 65þ) living with children in the period 1982–1990
remained 68% for older men and 74% for older women. However, between
1990 and 2000, the proportions of older people living with their children declined
to 59.9% and 68.7% for men and women, respectively (Benjamin et al., 2000; Zeng
and Wang, 2003). This has been less a consequence of a decline in tradition and
more a result of the one-child policy and the reduction of family size. With the rise
of one-child families there are fewer siblings available to make up multi-generation
households. Recent data show that approximately one-third of the Chinese popu-
lation lives in multigenerational households (Xu et al., 2014). Taking into account
the rural–urban divide, in rural areas, nearly 70% of adults aged over 60 lived with
an adult child in 1991, but by 2006 this share had fallen to just over 40%. In the
period 1982–2010, one-generation and two-generation households accounted for
over 80% of all households in China, but the proportion of three-generation house-
holds has remained stable over time. In contrast, the proportions of common types
of one-generation households (e.g. only-couple and single-person households) have
grown over time (Hu and Peng, 2015).
Diversiﬁcation of the Chinese household entails the growth of household types
which are common in European countries. Examples include the elder-only house-
hold, elder single-person household and single-parent household, but also non-
standard types such as the two-generation elder-only household (household of
two generations of seniors) and multiple-member elder household. Multiple-
member elder households are households where a younger-elder lives with their
parents, partners, siblings or other members of their generation. All these house-
hold types, together with the generation-skipping household, the DINK household
and the left-behind household are thought to have been the result of increased
migration ﬂows. Although the proportion of these households is small, it is steadily
growing. This growth is linked to the population ageing dynamics, as well as the
low fertility rate. The household types are invariably related to the rural–urban
divide in China. For example, in 2010, two-thirds of the two-generation elder-only
households and multiple-member elder households were rural (Hu and Peng, 2015).
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Moreover, not only intergenerational relationships and transfers, but also co-
residences with horizontal kin such as siblings are increasing over time, especially
among rural Chinese with no children or those with migrant children. Similarly,
half of the generation-skipping households are rural households. A 72.3%
increase in the proportion of elderly couple households from 1990 to 2010 makes
this the fastest-growing type of residence model for older adults (Hu and
Peng, 2015). In addition to the diversiﬁcation of households, researchers in
China have noted a shift from ‘parent-centred’ to ‘child-centred’ co-residences.
These changes have been linked to a broader reversal of intergenerational power
balance from the older to the younger generation (Ma and Wen, 2016; Yan, 2003),
due to unprecedented economic prosperity, as well as mobility of the young
generation.
In contrast to the co-residence trends in China, in Western European countries,
generations usually live in close proximity, and levels of co-residence are low.
Researchers note that co-residence is considered a ‘more or less involuntary living
situation, which results from economic necessity and is subject to ﬁnancial restrictions’
(Isengard and Szydlik, 2012; Kohli et al., 2000). Therefore, most of the European
research focuses on determinants of geographical proximity between generations,
rather than co-residence. Results from survey data from 2004 show that in
Germany around 10% of adult children live with a parent aged 60 or older, as do
12% in the Netherlands (Albertini et al., 2007). In Germany, 10% of older parents
live with an adult child, and in the Netherlands the proportion is much lower (5.4%).
These proportions are low compared to Southern European countries, but
much higher than Scandinavian countries. The percentage of women aged 65 and
over living alone (with no husband or children) has increased consistently from 1970
to 1990 in the UK (from 34% to 48%) and the Netherlands (from 28% to 41%)
(Tomassini et al., 2004). In 2005, only 2% of children from the 2000 cohort lived in
three-generation households in the UK (Pilkauskas and Martinson, 2014).
Notably, the co-residence trends in China exhibit similarities to those in European
countries as there is an increase in independent living, although co-residence remains
much more prevalent in China and remains the dominant mode of intergenerational
transfers.
Intergenerational transfers in China are based on obligation, whereas in
Europe the focus is on relationship quality
Data from the 2011 CFPS baseline survey reveals that although about 43% of
persons aged 60 and over lived with a child, a further 31% had a child living in the
same neighbourhood, and a further 13% had a child in the same county but not in
the same neighbourhood (Lei et al., 2013). A signiﬁcant proportion of Chinese
elderly depend on their children for old age support, including ﬁnancial assistance
and care (Bian et al., 1998; Chu and Yu, 2010; Chu et al., 2011; Lei et al., 2013).
When older parents live with children, they are far more likely to live with sons
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than with daughters (Chu et al., 2011). With regards to ﬁnancial transfers, ﬁnancial
support to older parents has long accounted for the largest portion of parental
income in rural areas (Lee and Xiao, 1998). Although incomes have gone up, the
trend of upward ﬁnancial support has continued in the 2000s. For example, in 2003
98% of parents in rural areas reported receiving ﬁnancial support from at least one
child (Silverstein et al., 2006a).
Daughters and sons in China have frequently received diﬀerent treatment from
parents. Nonetheless, studies have repeatedly shown that daughters and sons both
provide ﬁnancial and practical support to ageing parents. For example, Whyte and
Xu (2003) showed that married daughters provided the same level of ﬁnancial
support as married sons in 1994, whereas Xie and Zhu (2009) found that married
daughters provided the most support in ﬁnances to parents in urban China in 1999.
Regarding caregiving, daughters provided more caregiving to parents than sons
(data from 1997–2000; Silverstein et al., 2006b), or caregiving equal to that of sons
and daughters-in-laws, according to a survey from 2001–2003 (Cong and
Silverstein, 2008). With regards to relationship quality, a study found that in
2010 the largest group (37.7%) of surveyed parent–child dyads practiced upward
ﬁnancial transfers and had moderate to low relationship quality (Emery et al., in
press). Recent empirical studies showed that intergenerational transfers in China
display asymmetry, with upward ﬁnancial transfers and downward support in the
form of grandparental care (Ma and Wen, 2016; Yu and Xie, 2018).
The direction of intergenerational transfers in Western European countries is the
opposite of those in China. Older parents in European countries provide ﬁnancial
transfers to adult children rather than the other way around, as well as social support
in the form of care for grandchildren (Albertini et al., 2007). However, the propor-
tion of parents providing money to adult children varies over European countries.
For example, in 2004, around 22% of parents in Germany and 27% of those in the
Netherlands provided ﬁnancial support to adult children. The frequency of providing
parents with types of non-monetary support (e.g. care and help) diﬀers by country,
but the proportion of parents who provide such support to adult children in Europe
remains low (12% in Germany and 13% in the Netherlands in 2004). When care for
grandchildren is taken into account, the proportions are somewhat higher – 44% in
Germany and 59% in the Netherlands – but the intensity of taking care of grand-
children is considered low. A typology of intergenerational relationships across
European countries has shown that around 35% of parent–child dyads in
Germany and the Netherlands are characterised by downward ﬁnancial transfers,
close geographic proximity and weak norms of family obligation (Dykstra and
Fokkema, 2011). Existing empirical evidence has also pointed out that in Western
Europe the family specialises in support that requires less time and skill (e.g. house-
hold chores and paperwork) to the extent that public institutions take over the most
demanding activities of personal and physical care (Brandt et al., 2009). Recent
studies have conﬁrmed that despite the great social changes after 2008, downward
transfers continue to dominate intergenerational relationships across European
countries (Albertini, 2016).
18 Chinese Journal of Sociology 0(0)
Summary and conclusion
Explanations for declining rates of marriage and fertility in the European countries
have often referenced the SDT, but authors have been sceptical of the appropriate-
ness of the SDT framework for understanding similar trends in China (Raymo et al.,
2015). Demographic trends surrounding marriage, particularly the high economic
costs of marriage, as well as age and educational homogamy, seem to be converging
across China and Western European countries. Scholars agree that the increased age
of marriage in China resembles that in Western societies and is linked to the rise in
inequality across social groups (Wang and Mason, 2008). Nonetheless, references to
the SDT are limited in the Chinese context, as the pace of demographic changes in
China suggests that this framework does not provide further understanding of why
demographic patterns such as marriage sequencing and narrow marriage intervals
persist in China. Instead, cultural explanations dominate the literature about the
exclusivity of the Chinese (Asian) context.
Authors have repeatedly highlighted Confucian norms and values as primary
sources of both changes and stability of demographic trends, and discarded mod-
ernisation frameworks as obsolete to explaining changes over time in Chinese
families (Chu et al., 2011; Mu and Xie, 2014; Raymo et al., 2015; Xie and Zhu,
2009; Yu and Xie, 2015a, 2015b). Along with emphasising value changes, modern-
isation theories have contrasted starkly with the persistent patriarchal and patri-
lineal values present in China. Nonetheless, despite some stable features of
intergenerational relationships in China (e.g. high proportions of co-residence),
recent empirical research is showing substantive changes in the nature of interge-
nerational transfers. Over time, daughters have become greater providers of ﬁnan-
cial and practical support to parents (Cong and Silverstein, 2008; Guo et al., 2009;
Xie and Zhu, 2009), despite persistent son preference. Given these changes, the
common cultural explanations emphasising Confucian values have provided lim-
ited understanding as to why daughters are stepping in, why fertility rates are
dropping and why marriage is being delayed in China.
With regards to fertility, there is also a sign of convergence in all countries, as
parenthood is becoming more exclusive, and more common only for couples who
are economically well-oﬀ. Authors have suggested that the shifts from universal
to exclusive parenthood are due to the increasing opportunity costs of marriage
for women (especially for women with higher levels of education), and the
decreasing ability of men to fulﬁl the provider role (especially men with lower
levels of education) (Bumpass et al., 2009; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b, 2006;
Raymo et al., 2015; Rindfuss et al., 2004). The explanations for fertility decline
in China and Europe remain fundamentally diﬀerent at ﬁrst sight, but across
contexts, economic factors have been pointed out as main drivers of fertility
decline. In the Chinese context, economic progress has been linked to greater
female independence and lower fertility rates, whereas in the European context
economic depressions have been linked to reduced opportunity for realising a
couple’s fertility preferences.
Djundeva et al. 19
A growing consensus among European scholars is that postmodern values do
not provide a suﬃcient and necessary explanation for the recent increase in fertility
rates and marriage formations, and decline in divorce rates. Instead, an economic
argument has been put forward that the variation over time in demographic pat-
terns regarding family formation has been largely a response to economic oppor-
tunities, and not a consequence of changing preferences (Esping-Andersen and
Billari, 2015). Studies investigating preferences have shown that preferences for
marriage, motherhood and the desired number of children have remained stable
in Europe over decades (Scott and Braun, 2006; Sleebos, 2003), as have preferences
for ideal family size in the period 1979–2012 (Sobotka and Beaujouan, 2014).
Postmodern value changes have been reported only in terms of more permissive
attitudes towards sexuality (Scott and Braun, 2006). Pointing out this stability in
preferences, European scholars have argued that the reversal of the fertility decline
during the 2000s challenges the notion of the ‘decline of the family’ (Billari, 2008;
Billari et al., 2006). In contrast, Chinese studies on preferences have hinted that the
one-child policy is in line with people’s preferences for small family size (see Basten
and Gu, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the preferences for small families have more often
been reported by the higher educated and wealthier Chinese.
A common feature in the literature on family change in Asia and Europe is the
acknowledgment of the role of rising gender egalitarianism. In European fertility
studies, gender egalitarianism has been identiﬁed as the equilibrium point necessary
for trend reversal in fertility (increase in fertility rates) (Esping-Andersen and
Billari, 2015), whereas the scholarship on China’s fertility decline has been domi-
nated by McDonald’s (2000a, 2000b, 2006) fertility postponement theory. Using
equilibrium theories that incorporate values and institutions can provide better
understanding not only of the changes in fertility and marriage across China and
Europe, but also of the changes in intergenerational transfers in line with cultural
explanations. Future researchers may want to focus on investigating whether China
will reach an equilibrium similar to that in the Scandinavian European countries
(after the year 2000). Another question that Chinese scholars are faced with is the
extent to which the one-child policy has exclusively contributed to the reduction in
fertility rates. In line with developmental idealism and the equilibrium thesis,
Chinese fertility rates might have declined to current levels without the one-child
family planning policy. Many important questions remain unanswered, but given
the preoccupation of European demographers with low fertility rates, it remains to
be seen whether recent changes in the one-child policy will shift the focus of
Chinese demography to low fertility rates as well.
Lower fertility has great implications for Chinese families. Forecasts predict fur-
ther convergence in line with the trends observed in European countries, namely rises
in single-person households and one-generation households (Yi et al., 2008; Yi and
Wang, 2014). Shrinking family size implies that the likelihood of parents living with
their children will decrease further in the future. One implication of changing fertility
levels might be an advanced verticalisation of families such as the one that happened
to European families in the second half of the 21st century (Hagestad, 1992).
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Another implication might be an unpredictable change in intergenerational transfers
due to changes in welfare policies. Notably, despite similarities in population ageing
in China and Europe, old-age and intergenerational relationships in the later life
course are markedly diﬀerent between countries. Welfare support across European
countries contributes to independence in old age (Albertini, 2016; Albertini et al.,
2007), whereas the limited state policies on intergenerational transfers in China give
incentives to the family to remain the major source of ﬁnancial support and care
tasks for its members (Logan et al., 1998; Logan and Bian, 2003). If China continues
on the same path of economic progress, future research on intergenerational rela-
tionships in China may start to focus less on economic transfers in families and, as in
European countries, lay more emphasis on studying family members’ health, well-
being and relationship quality.
In Europe there is great emphasis on the role of the welfare state, especially in
investigating educational diﬀerences in family trends (Berrington et al., 2015; De
Hauw et al., 2017; Nise´n et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2014). Welfare state redistribu-
tion in European countries and, consequently, the dampening of social inequalities,
has long been the focal point of European sociology (Blossfeld et al., 2016; Breen
and Jonsson, 2005), whereas educational diﬀerences in family patterns remain rela-
tively understudied in China. Nonetheless, a rise in gender egalitarianism has been
identiﬁed as the cause of both lower fertility and the decrease in intergenerational
co-residence across China and Western countries (Aboderin, 2004). Recent demo-
graphic trends and family patterns suggest that gender egalitarianism may also
constitute the ‘cure’ for balancing demographic trends and, moreover, for eco-
nomic development in the future (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015).
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